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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter comes on before the Court on the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue=s appeal from a decision of 
the United States Tax Court entered on November 5, 2009, in 
accordance with a Tax Court opinion dated April 13, 2009, and 
a stipulation of the parties dated October 28, 2009, that 
together provided that Appellee Denise Mannella did not owe 
any income taxes, interest, or penalties for the taxable years 
1996 through 2000.  In its opinion leading to its decision, the 
Tax Court invalidated a Treasury Department regulation, 26 
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C.F.R. ' 1.6015-5(b)(1), that sets a two-year deadline to file a 
claim for equitable Ainnocent spouse@ relief under 26 U.S.C. ' 
6015(f) from liability resulting from a jointly filed federal 
income tax return.  We now hold that the regulation is neither 
contrary to nor an impermissible implementation of section 
6015, and, therefore, inasmuch as Denise filed her claim for 
innocent spouse relief beyond the regulation=s two-year 
deadline for seeking such relief, we will reverse the decision of 
the Tax Court.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984).  We, 
however, will remand the case to that Court to consider an 
equitable tolling contention that Denise advances on this 
appeal with respect to the running of the two-year period.
1
  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
Before addressing the facts of this case, we first quote 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit=s thorough 
explanation of the relevant portions of the Internal Revenue 
Code and the related Treasury Department regulation at issue: 
                                                 
1 There is no issue raised on this appeal concerning the 
calculation of the taxes, interest, or penalties. 
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Taxpayers filing a joint return are jointly and 
severally liable for the entire tax liability shown 
or that should have been shown on their return.  
26 U.S.C. ' 6013(d)(3).  But section 6015 of the 
Internal Revenue Code sets forth 
grounds->innocent spouse= rules first added to the 
Code in 1971 and liberalized since . . . -for 
relieving the signer of a joint return of his or her 
joint and several liability for understatement or 
nonpayment of income tax due. 
Section 6015(f), captioned >equitable relief,= 
provides that >under procedures prescribed by 
the [Secretary of Treasury], if (1) taking into 
account all the facts and circumstances, it is 
inequitable to hold the individual liable for any 
unpaid tax or any deficiency . . . ; and (2) relief is 
not available to such individual under subsection 
(b) or (c) [of section 6015], the [Secretary] may 
relieve such individual of such liability.=  By 
regulation the Treasury has fixed a deadline for 
filing claims under subsection (f) of two years 
from the IRS=s first action to collect the tax by 
(for example) issuing a notice of intent to levy on 
the taxpayer=s property.  26 C.F.R. ' 
1.6015-5(b)(1); see also IRS Rev. Proc.2003-61 
' 4.01(3); 26 U.S.C. ' 6630(a). 
Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).  As the 
foregoing passage indicates, the two-year deadline for seeking 
relief under section 6015(f) does not arise from section 6015 
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but rather comes from the Treasury regulation implementing 
subsection 6015(f). 
Subsections (b) and (c) of section 6015 also provide 
avenues of relief for innocent spouses, but, in contrast to 
subsection (f), both contain two-year filing deadlines for 
seeking such relief.  Subsection (b) provides:  
Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary [of 
Treasury], ifB  
(A) a joint return has been made 
for a taxable year;  
(B) on such return there is an 
understatement of tax attributable 
to erroneous items of one 
individual filing the joint return;  
(C) the other individual filing the 
joint return establishes that in 
signing the return he or she did not 
know, and had no reason to know, 
that there was such 
understatement;  
(D) taking into account all the 
facts and circumstances, it is 
inequitable to hold the other 
individual liable for the deficiency 
in tax for such taxable year 
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attributable to such 
understatement; and  
(E) the other individual elects (in 
such form as the Secretary may 
prescribe) the benefits of this 
subsection not later than the date 
which is 2 years after the date the 
Secretary has begun collection 
activities with respect to the 
individual making the election,  
then the other individual shall be relieved of 
liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and 
other amounts) for such taxable year to the 
extent such liability is attributable to such 
understatement.  
26 U.S.C. ' 6015(b)(1) (emphasis added).  Subsection (c) 
provides for an allocation of liability if the signer of a joint 
return is divorced, legally separated, or no longer living in the 
same household as the individual with whom the signer filed 
the joint return.  In a provision paralleling subsection 
(b)(1)(E), subsection (c) provides that a taxpayer seeking relief 
under (c) must elect such relief Anot later than 2 years after the 
date on which the [Secretary] has begun collection activities 
with respect to the individual making the election.@  26 U.S.C. 
' 6015(c)(3)(B). 
 
B. Facts 
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Denise
2
 and her husband Anthony Mannella filed joint 
federal income tax returns for the years 1996 through 2000.  
The Mannellas agreed to the assessment of a deficiency for the 
year 1996.  For the years 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, the 
Mannellas did not pay fully the taxes their returns showed as 
due.  Consequently, the Commissioner on June 4, 2004, 
initiated collection procedures to recover the back taxes that 
they owed by sending the Mannellas separate notices of his 
intent to levy.  The notices indicated, however, that the 
Mannellas each had the right to a collection-due-process 
hearing before such levy.    
The notices instructed the Mannellas how to obtain 
innocent spouse relief under section 6015 by including an IRS 
publication titled AWhat You Should Know About [t]he IRS 
Collection Process,@ which contained the following provision: 
                                                 
2Our use of Denise Mannella=s first name in this opinion does 
not suggest a lack of respect but rather is intended to keep the 
opinion clear with respect to the parties= identification. 
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Help for an innocent spouse C In some cases, 
you may not be responsible for taxes, interest, 
and penalties on a joint income tax return.  
Contact your local IRS office for more 
information.  For information about your rights 
as an innocent spouse, see Publication 971, 
Innocent Spouse Relief.  For information on 
three ways to get help with the amount you owe, 
see Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse 
Relief (And Separation of Liability and 
Equitable Relief). 
2 App. at 39, 42.  The notices also included IRS Form 12153, 
which states that A[i]f you believe that your spouse or former 
spouse should be responsible for all or a portion of the tax 
liability from your tax return, check here [__] and attach Form 
8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, to this request.@  2 
App. at 51. 
The IRS sent the notices to the Mannellas= correct 
address by certified mail return receipt requested.  IRS 
records indicate that it received signed return receipts dated 
June 17, 2004, for both notices at an IRS Service Center.  
Denise asserts, however, that her husband signed her name on 
the return receipt and did not inform her that the notice had 
arrived until more than two years after its arrival and the 
Commissioner does not challenge this assertion.  On 
November 1, 2006, after learning of the notice of intent to levy 
and speaking with an attorney, Denise filed two Form 8857 
applications under section 6015, subsections (b), (c), and (f), 
for innocent spouse relief from joint and several liability on the 
Mannellas= joint returns filed for the years 1996-2000.  The 
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Commissioner, however, issued Denise a notice of 
determination dated May 3, 2007, denying her relief under 
section 6015 because she had not filed her claim within two 
years of June 4, 2004, the date that the Commissioner took his 
first collection action against her by mailing her notice of the 
intent to levy.  Denise does not contend that the 
Commissioner misapplied the statutory and regulatory 
two-year deadline periods, as written, as she does not assert 
that she filed her applications within the two-year statutory and 
regulatory deadlines period allowed for such applications. 
 
C. Procedural History 
In response to the Commissioner=s rejection of her 
applications, Denise, acting pro se, filed a petition for relief 
with the Tax Court, contending in part: 
My claim for relief was denied because it was 
filed 4 2 months to[o] late.  When the 
collection process was started against me [on] 
June 4, 2004[,] it was immediately stopped.  I 
was informed by my husband that everything 
was handled and that I was not liable for his tax 
obligation.  The IRS stopped collection activity 
against me so I thought it was taken care of.  I 
was not aware of any other problems and never 
received any other papers from the IRS 
concerning my liability for his taxes or anything 
concerning my rights as an innocent spouse.  I 
never received any benefits from my husband 
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not paying his taxes. . . . Denying my claim 
because it was filed late when I was never 
informed that a time limit existed is wrong. 
2 App. at 4.  Denise=s husband was informed of his right to 
intervene in the Tax Court proceedings, but did not do so.   
The Commissioner moved for summary judgment on 
the sole basis that Denise=s applications for relief under section 
6015 were untimely.  She opposed the motion on the ground 
that she never received her notice from her husband and 
therefore the two-year period for seeking innocent spouse 
relief should not have begun to run against her.  Denise 
represented to the Tax Court that she and her husband were 
prepared to testify in support of her contentions at a trial.  She 
did not argue, however, that the regulation setting a two-year 
deadline for requesting relief under subsection 6015(f) was 
invalid. 
In an opinion dated April 13, 2009, the Tax Court 
granted the Commissioner=s motion for summary judgment in 
part and denied it in part.  The Court determined that the 
mailing of the notice to Denise=s last known address triggered 
the running of the two-year deadline periods under subsections 
6015(b) and (c) regardless of whether she actually received the 
June 4, 2004 notice.  Accordingly, the Tax Court granted the 
Commissioner=s motion for summary judgment on Denise=s 
claims under those subsections.  Nevertheless, the Court sua 
sponte held that the two-year regulatory deadline under 
subsection 6015(f) was invalid, a conclusion that it based on its 
prior decision in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131 
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(2009).
3
  Consequently, the Court concluded that Denise=s 
subsection (f) claim was timely and it denied the 
Commissioner summary judgment on that claim.   
After the Tax Court filed its opinion, the parties 
executed a stipulation that if Denise=s subsection (f) request 
had been timely, which it was if the regulation was invalid, 
Denise Ais entitled to relief from all joint and several liabilities 
in income tax, additions to tax, penalties and assessed interest@ 
for all the taxable years within the scope of this action.  See 2 
App. at 74.   Following the filing of the stipulation, the Tax 
Court entered a decision on November 5, 2009, in Denise=s 
favor, but reserving the Commissioner=s right to appeal, which 
he has done. 
 
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Tax Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. '' 
6015(e)(1)(A)(ii) and 7442, and we have jurisdiction to review 
that Court=s decision granting summary judgment pursuant to 
26 U.S.C. ' 7482(a)(1).  Our review of the Tax Court=s 
decision is plenary.  Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 
                                                 
3As we discuss below, after the Tax Court filed its opinion and 
decision in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit reversed the Tax Court decision in Lantz in an opinion 
filed June 8, 2010.  See 607 F.3d 479.  In this opinion we 
refer to the Tax Court opinion in that litigation as Lantz v. 
Commissioner and the Court of Appeals opinion as Lantz. 
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Comm=r, 177 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 1999); ACM P=ship v. 
Comm=r, 157 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
The primary issue on this appeal is whether the 
Secretary validly exercised his rulemaking authority in 
adopting the regulation setting a two-year deadline for 
requesting relief under subsection 6015(f).  In considering 
this issue we apply the principles the Supreme Court set forth 
in Chevron that we recently explained as follows: 
[U]nder Chevron, we must first determine >if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue of law in the case, using traditional 
tools of statutory construction to determine 
whether Congress had an intention on the precise 
question at issue.=  If congressional intent is 
clear, >the inquiry ends, as both the agency and 
the court must give effect to the plain language 
of the statute.=  Where, however, a >statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the court proceeds to step two, where it 
inquires whether the agency=s answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute.= 
Lin-Zheng v. Attorney Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(en banc) (internal citations omitted).  The Tax Court in this 
case, following its opinion in Lantz v. Commissioner in which 
it had applied Chevron, held that the regulation conflicts with 
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the clear language of subsection 6015(f) and that, even if the 
language of the statute is ambiguous, the regulation 
impermissibly implements that subsection.   Denise, with 
effective assistance from amicus curiae, supplements the Tax 
Court opinion by arguing that even if we uphold the regulation 
under Chevron, the two-year filing deadline is subject to the 
doctrine of equitable tolling and that there should be equitable 
tolling in her case to the end that her applications were timely.  
We consider each issue in turn. 
 
A. Lantz 
As we have indicated, in invalidating the regulation the 
Tax Court followed its prior decision in Lantz v. 
Commissioner in which it stated: 
[b]y explicitly creating a 2-year limitation in 
subsections (b) and (c) but not subsection (f) [of 
section 6015], Congress has >spoken= by its 
audible silence.  Because the regulation 
imposes a limitation that Congress explicitly 
incorporated into subsections (b) and (c) but 
omitted from subsection (f), it fails the first 
prong of Chevron. 
132 T.C. at 139.  The Tax Court further reasoned that because 
subsection (f), in terms, is only available to taxpayers 
ineligible for relief under subsections (b) or (c), Congress, by 
omitting the two-year time limit in subsection (f), intended that 
the subsection be available to taxpayers who missed the filing 
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deadline under subsections (b) or (c) as a result of some 
inequity.  Id. at 139-41.   
After the Commissioner filed his opening brief on this 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit released 
the opinion in Lantz, which we quote above, reversing the 
decision of the Tax Court in that case and upholding the 
two-year regulatory deadline for claims filed under subsection 
6015(f).  In its opinion the Court of Appeals rejected the Tax 
Court=s theory of  Aaudible silence.@  In so doing, the Court 
noted that Aif there is no deadline in subsection (f), the 
two-year deadlines in subsections (b) and (c) will be set largely 
at naught because the substantive criteria of those subsections 
are virtually the same as those of [subsection] (f).@  Lantz, 607 
F.3d at 484.   The Court found further support for its decision 
in several of section 6015=s provisionsCincluding the 
introductory phrase of subsection (f)Cexpressly granting the 
Secretary rulemaking authority, and in the circumstance that 
subsection (f), rather than requiring the Secretary to grant 
relief if certain conditions are met, vests him with discretion to 
grant such relief.  Id. at 485; see Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 
230, 243-44, 121 S.Ct. 714, 723-24 (2001) (A[E]ven if a 
statutory scheme requires individualized determinations . . . 
the decisionmaker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to 
resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Congress 
clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority.@) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
B. Chevron - Step 1 
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The Supreme Court in Chevron instructed that courts, 
when analyzing administrative regulations to determine if they 
are valid, first should look at whether Congress has Adirectly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.@  467 U.S. at 842, 104 
S.Ct. at 2781.  Denise argues that Congress unequivocally has 
spoken to the question at issue here and has precluded the 
Secretary from adopting a regulation establishing a two-year 
filing deadline under subsection (f).  She predicates this 
contention on the correct observation that Congress did not 
include a two-year filing deadline in subsection (f) equivalent 
to that it did include in subsections (b) and (c).  Rather, 
Congress instructed the Secretary to consider all relevant facts 
and circumstances when deciding whether to grant relief under 
subsection (f), and stated that relief is available under 
subsection (f) only if unavailable under (b) and (c).  We 
disagree with Denise on this point. 
Section 6015 tells us nothing about when claims may be 
brought under subsection (f) as the section does not address 
this point.  We agree with the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit that this silence is not made audible by the 
presence of deadlines in subsections (b) and (c).  Though we 
recognize that A[i]t is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely when it includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another,@ see 
City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338, 114 
S.Ct. 1588, 1593 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted), the absence of a statutory filing deadline in 
subsection (f) similar to those in subsections (b) and (c) does 
not require us to conclude that the Secretary cannot impose a 
two-year deadline by regulation.   
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It is important to recognize that there can be several 
explanations for Congress=s omission of a deadline for filing an 
application for relief under subsection (f).  To start with, 
Congress may have intended to defer the issue of timing to the 
Secretary who can establish procedures for granting relief 
under subsection (f) and can determine whether relief, no 
matter when sought, should be granted.
4
  On the other hand, it 
is possible that Congress intended that there not be a deadline 
for claims under subsection (f) or, alternatively, that any 
deadline imposed by a regulation under that subsection be 
greater than the two-year period provided in subsections (b) 
and (c).  But we cannot say that section 6015, in terms, 
requires that we embrace any particular view of Congress=s 
intent with respect to a subsection (f) filing deadline.  
                                                 
4There is considerable discussion on this appeal between the 
parties involving the question of whether a limitations period is 
procedural or substantive.  But we will not focus on that 
discussion as we are not concerned with issues such as the 
applicability of federal or state law under Erie R. Co. v. 
Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938), or the choice of 
law when the law of different states may be implicated in 
litigation.  Rather, we are concerned with whether Congress 
intended to authorize the Secretary to include a filing time 
deadline among the Aprocedures@ that he can adopt to 
implement subsection 6015(f).   
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Nor is the question of whether there can be a two-year 
deadline period under subsection (f) answered by its provision 
that the Secretary Atak[e] into account all the facts and 
circumstances@ when deciding whether to grant relief under 
that subsection.  See 26 U.S.C. ' 6015(f)(1).  Denise argues 
that this instruction makes clear that the timing of the request is 
a factor that the Secretary must take into account in 
considering a claim under subsection 6015(f).  Congress, 
however, included an identical instruction in subsection (b), 
see 26 U.S.C. ' 6015(b)(1)(D), despite the presence of an 
explicit filing deadline in that subsection, see subsection 
(b)(1)(E), and the requirement that relief be granted if all the 
criteria listed in subsection (b)(1) are satisfied.  The Secretary 
thus cannot grant relief to a taxpayer who elects to seek 
subsection (b) relief after the deadline under that subsection 
has passed, nor can he consider timing as a factor in a 
determination of whether to grant relief if the taxpayer makes a 
request for relief within the two-year period.  Because the 
Secretary is prevented from considering the timing of an 
election for relief under subsection (b) notwithstanding the 
statutory instruction to Atak[e] into account all the facts and 
circumstances,@ we hardly can hold that the exact same 
instruction clearly requires the Secretary to consider the timing 
of a request for relief on an individualized basis under 
subsection (f).   
Denise also points to the circumstance that relief under 
subsection (f) is limited to individuals ineligible for relief 
under subsections (b) and (c).  See 26 U.S.C. ' 6015(f)(2).  
Because the requirements for relief under subsections (b) and 
(f) are similar, though not identical, Denise argues that 
Congress must have intended that relief under subsection (f) be 
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available to persons who missed the filing deadline under 
subsection (b).  Yet Denise does not dispute that, regardless of 
timing, a taxpayer would be eligible for relief under subsection 
(f) but not subsection (b) when the taxpayer is seeking relief 
from liability for an underpayment as distinguished from an 
understatement of taxes, undoubtedly a very large category of 
cases, or when the taxpayer is seeking relief from an 
understatement that he or she knew or should have known was 
made.  Accordingly, subsection (f)=s exclusion of those 
eligible for relief under subsection (b) and (c) sheds little light 
on the question before us.   
What subsection (f)(2) may mean is that for relief to be 
granted under subsection (f) it must never have been available 
under subsection (b) or (c) whether or not timely sought under 
those subsections.  Indeed, such a view of Congress=s intent 
would be consistent with the establishment of explicit deadline 
periods in subsections (b) and (c).  Along this line we point 
out that it would be strange if Congress established a deadline 
for a claim under one subsection but also provided that a 
claimant at a date beyond that deadline could make the same 
claim for the same type of relief under another subsection and 
thereby effectively by-pass the deadline period.  In addressing 
this point we reiterate that among the reasons that relief might 
be available under subsection (f) that never was available 
under subsection (b) or (c) is that subsection (f) relief may be 
available for both understatements and underpayments of taxes 
whereas subsections (b) and (c) are limited to understatements.  
Therefore, the provision of subsection (f) limiting the 
availability of that subsection to taxpayers ineligible for relief 
under subsection (b) and (c) has real meaning even if it does 
not save claims that had been, but no longer are, within the 
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scope of subsections (b) and (c) because, if asserted, they 
would be untimely under those two subsections.  Overall, we 
see no escape from the conclusion that section 6015 is 
ambiguous on the question of when a request for relief may be 
brought under subsection (f). 
 
C. Chevron - Step 2 
Inasmuch as Congress has not spoken directly to the 
precise question in issue, i.e., can the Secretary by regulation 
establish a deadline for a taxpayer to seek subsection (f) relief, 
we next must examine whether the Secretary=s imposition of a 
two-year deadline for claims brought under subsection (f) 
permissibly implements that subsection.  In resolving this 
question, we defer to the Secretary=s implementation of the 
subsection Aunless the legislative history or the purpose and 
structure of the act clearly reveal a contrary intent on the part 
of Congress.@  Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Comm=n v. O=Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass=n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
470 U.S. 116, 126, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1108 (1985)).  ASo long as 
the regulation bears a fair relationship to the language of the 
statute, reflects the views of those who sought its enactment, 
and matches the purpose they articulated, it will merit 
deference.=@  Id. at 110 (quoting Sekula v. F.D.I.C., 39 F.3d 
448, 452 (3d Cir. 1994)).
5
  We therefore turn to the legislative 
                                                 
5The deference is particularly broad when the regulation is 
adopted pursuant to authority in a specific statute as 
distinguished from being adopted under general rule making 
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history and purpose of section 6015 to determine whether they 
reveal that Congress had an intent in adopting section 6015(f) 
that was contrary to the regulation establishing the two-year 
deadline.  See id.
                                                                                                             
authority.  See Armstrong World Indus. Inc. v. Comm=r, 974 
F.2d 422, 441 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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In her brief, Denise discusses the legislative history of 
the provisions at issue at some length.  In particular, she 
points to statements various Senators made and passages from 
a joint conference report to the effect that Congress intended to 
expand significantly the prior innocent spouse provisions in 
1998 and 2006.  See appellee=s br. at 25-34.  Certainly there 
is no doubt but that Congress significantly expanded the 
circumstances in which a taxpayer could obtain innocent 
spouse relief when it enacted section 6015 in its current form.  
For example, the current statute eliminates the previous 
requirements that innocent spouse relief be limited to grossly 
erroneous items attributable to the other spouse and that the 
Secretary grant relief only for understatements exceeding a 
certain monetary threshold.  See 26 U.S.C. ' 6013(e), 
repealed by Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 
1998, (ARRA@), Pub. L. No. 105-206 ' 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 
740.   Moreover, the addition of subsection (f), 
notwithstanding the Secretary=s adoption of the regulatory 
two-year deadline, allows for the possibility of there being 
relief for underpayments and for understatements of which the 
taxpayer seeking relief knew or should have known.  
The closest Denise is able to come to pointing to any 
legislative history suggesting that Congress in enacting 
subsection 6015(f) had an intent inconsistent with the terms of 
the regulation is in the legislative history of 26 U.S.C. ' 66.  
That provision of the Internal Revenue Code addresses the 
treatment of community property in community property states 
when spouses do not file income tax returns jointly.  Congress 
amended subsection (c) of section 66 by the same act that 
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created subsection 6015(f)
6
 and therefore, not surprisingly, 
subsection 66 provides for equitable relief in language that 
mirrors that of subsection 6015(f).  See 26 U.S.C. ' 66(c)(4); 
RRA Pub. L. No. 105-206 ' 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 740.  Some 
statements in the legislative history of section 66(c) suggest 
that the Secretary, when Ataking into account all the facts and 
circumstances,@ 26 U.S.C. ' 66(c)(4), should consider the 
timing of the request for relief.   
The foregoing history, which the Tax Court discussed 
in its opinion in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 141-44, 
lends some support to Denise=s position, but it fails to 
overcome the deference that we must give to Treasury 
Regulation ' 1.6015-5(b)(1) under Chevron and it does not 
clearly demonstrate that Congress intended that requests for 
relief under subsection 6015(f) not be subject to a two-year 
filing deadline.  Accordingly, the regulation is valid.  See 
also Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm=r, 515 F.3d 162, 172 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (ADrawing [a] temporal line [to claim a tax 
deduction] is a task properly within the powers and expertise 
of the IRS.  Chevron recognizes the notion that the IRS is in a 
superior position to make judgments concerning the 
administration of the ambiguities in its enabling statute.@). 
                                                 
6See RRA, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. 
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Finally, in our discussion of Chevron we take note of 
Denise=s argument that the inclusion of deadline periods in 
subsections (b) and (c) but omission of such a period in 
subsection (f) Ademonstrates Congressional intent that requests 
for equitable relief not be subject to a bright-line time 
limitation, but rather allow the taxpayer to request relief during 
the 10-year collection period of [26 U.S.C.] ' 6502.@  
Appellee=s br. at 15.  But inasmuch as Section 6502 is a 
limitation only on the government=s time for collection, Denise 
really is arguing that there is no deadline for filing a subsection 
(f) claim and that the Secretary by regulation cannot fill the 
void that Congress left by omitting such a deadline.  We are 
reluctant to reach such a result as it would be inconsistent with 
the practice of the federal courts to borrow statutes of 
limitations from appropriate sources, even state law, to fill the 
void that Congress leaves when it does not establish a statute of 
limitations.  See, e.g., Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 366 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  Moreover, Denise=s argument is hardly consistent 
with the general practice of Congress to provide for all sorts of 
specific periods for action to be taken under the Internal 
Revenue Code.
7
 
                                                 
7We have not overlooked our contemporaneous opinion in Rea 
v. Federated Investors, No. 10-1440, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25501, at * 7,      F.3d     ,      (3d Cir. Dec. 15, 2010), a 
case construing a statute dealing with employment protection 
to persons who had been or were in bankruptcy enacted in a 
format in some ways similar to that in section 6015.  There we 
would not expand on the limited protection given to persons in 
private employment from bankruptcy discrimination to include 
the more expansive protection from bankruptcy discrimination 
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given to pubic employees.  In Rea we declined to Acontravene 
congressional intent by implying statutory language that 
Congress omitted.@  But Rea dealt with the construction of a 
statute, not with whether a regulation implementing a statute 
should be upheld under the principles in Chevron, the issue 
involved here.  Thus, though we uphold the regulation at issue 
here we are not Aimplying@ anything into section 6015. 
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D. Equitable Tolling 
Denise lastly argues that even if the regulation is valid, 
it is subject to equitable tolling and she urges that the deadline 
period be tolled here.
8
  We have held that Athe tolling of filing 
deadlines is appropriate where principles of equity would 
make the rigid application of a limitation period unfair.@  
Walker v. Astrue, 593 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   There may be 
equitable tolling A(1) where the defendant has actively misled 
the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of action; (2) where 
the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented 
from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has 
timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong 
forum.@  Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 751 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  But 
inasmuch as the Tax Court did not address the equitable tolling 
issue and additional facts not in the record may be material to 
the issue we think that that Court should explore the issue in 
the first instance.  We therefore will remand the case to the 
Tax Court to decide whether the Treasury Department 
regulation at 26 C.F.R. ' 1.6015-5(b)(1) is subject to equitable 
tolling and, if so, whether Denise meets the equitable tolling 
standard.  
 
                                                 
8 In the section of her brief dealing with equitable tolling 
Denise does not explain why there should be equitable tolling 
in this case.  Rather, she concentrates on why there can be 
equitable tolling. 
 
 27 
 V.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons we will reverse the decision 
of the Tax Court entered November 5, 2009, to the extent that 
that decision reflected the Tax Court=s opinion that the 
regulatory deadline for claims under subsection 6015(f) is 
invalid, and will remand the case to the Tax Court to consider 
the equitable tolling issue.  The parties will bear their own 
costs on this appeal. 
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Denise Mannella v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
No. 10-1308 
                                                                                                                                                
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 Spouses seeking relief from joint and several liability 
for understatements or underpayments of income taxes look 
to 26 U.S.C. § 6015.  Among other things, it spares innocent 
spouses when it is equitable to do so.  Id. § 6015(b) (dealing 
with understatements).
1
  But to be eligible for relief they must 
apply within two years after the IRS begins collection 
activity.  Id. § 6015(b). 
 What if an innocent spouse does not qualify because 
two years have passed since collection efforts began?  It 
appears there is a safety-valve (Ms. Mannella’s counsel calls 
it a ―catchall‖) ─ § 6015(f).  All that it requires, other than 
showing relief is not available under subsection (b), is that it 
not be fair to hold the innocent spouse responsible for the 
other spouse’s tax liability.  The intuitive (indeed, blink) 
thought, then, is that the time to file under subsection (f) 
extends beyond two years.  After all, it can’t logically be less 
time, as subsection (b) is available for at least some taxpayers 
who elect within two years, and thus, one would think, (f) 
would be available for later applicants.    
  
       Is it that easy?  Well, no.  There is a catch (as opposed 
                                                 
1
 Section 6015(c) also provides relief for certain 
divorced or separated taxpayers, and for these persons 
imposes an explicit two-year statute of limitations.  However, 
it is of little relevance to our case and is not discussed in this 
dissent.  
 2 
 
to a catchall), we are told.  Though subsection (f) enacted by 
Congress sets no time limit to seek relief, the Department of 
the Treasury
2
 has adopted a Regulation ─ 26 C.F.R. § 1.6015-
5(b)(1), complemented by IRS Rev. Proc. 2003-61 § 4.01(3)
3
 
─ that does.  It is two years.   
 The United States Tax Court has overruled that 
deadline, Mannella v. C.I.R., 132 T.C. 196 (2009), and the 
IRS appeals.  Its argument, which won in the Seventh Circuit 
Court’s decision in Lantz v. C.I.R., 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 
2010), is essentially that Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), requires us 
to defer to its judgment, as that judgment is reasonable.   
 The Tax Court, whose hands heretofore were tied only 
in the Seventh Circuit,
4
 reasons that the Regulation is invalid 
under step one of Chevron’s procedure for reviewing an 
agency’s construction of a statute it administers because 
Congress has spoken directly to the issue involved.  
Specifically, the Tax Court reasons that the Regulation ―runs 
directly contrary to the nature of the relief provided in section 
6015(f).‖  132 T.C. at 202.  And even were subsection (f) 
deemed silent or ambiguous, ―a 2-year limitations period is 
not a permissible construction of [that provision], and 
                                                 
2
 I use ―Department of the Treasury,‖ ―Secretary‖ (or 
―Secretary of the Treasury‖), the ―Service,‖ and ―IRS‖ 
interchangeably. 
3
 See also Rev. Proc. 2000-15 § 4.01(3). 
4
 See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 1970 WL 
2191 (1970), aff’d 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971) 
(determining that the Tax Court must apply the law of the 
Court of Appeals to which an appeal for that case would later 
lie).   
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therefore [the Regulation] is invalid under Chevron step 2,‖ 
id., which holds that congressional silence or ambiguity on a 
specific issue confers on the administrative agency the power 
to construe the statute in any way that is permissible (that is, 
reasonable).   
 I agree with my colleagues, and not the Tax Court, that 
Congress has not spoken directly on what the timeframe 
under subsection (f) must be.  Indeed, the subsection is 
literally silent.
5
   
 In that case, Chevron’s second step comes into play.  
My colleagues, and all three members of the panel in Lantz, 
hold that the Regulation passes muster.  They reason, per 
Chevron, that deference is due an agency’s construction of a 
statute it implements, i.e., a presumption of validity attends 
that construction.  Thus, though Ms. Mannella’s position has 
―support,‖ Maj. Op. at 22, and ―[t]he arguments against the 
Tax Court’s interpretation of subsection (f) as barring a fixed 
deadline . . . are powerful,‖ Lantz, 607 F.3d at 486, they do 
not overcome that presumption.  Put another way, that some, 
or even most, courts would have chosen a different deadline 
than that picked by the IRS is irrelevant, as the Supreme 
Court has settled since 1984 who gets first call in construing 
the statute.
6
 
                                                 
5
 That said, the Tax Court’s reasoning is not so 
specious that it deserves to be dismissed as simply 
oxymoronic by its use of ―audible silence.‖  Lantz, 607 F.3d 
at 481.  That gibe, however, does sidestep another oxymoron 
– humble pedantry. 
6
 As this is settled law, I don’t enter the well-vetted 
briarpatch of whether the Supreme Court should have 
accorded agencies of the Executive Branch interpretive 
powers that courts thought by tradition belonged to them.  See 
 4 
 
 But that first call must be reasonable.  It is hard to say 
that is so when the IRS gives no reasons for ―add[ing] a new 
threshold requirement,‖ Rev. Proc. 2003-61 §3.01, for 
subsection (f) eligibility.  ―It is well-established that an 
agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis 
articulated by the agency itself.‖ Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983).  
Here, however, the IRS has not advanced any reasoning for 
its decision to impose a two-year limitations period on 
taxpayers seeking relief under subsection (f), leaving us no 
basis to conduct the analysis mandated by Chevron step two.   
 There may exist justifications on which the IRS could 
have reasonably relied in order to impose a two-year limit on 
subsection (f) relief.  The problem is that there are also 
arbitrary and capricious reasons that, if articulated by the 
Service as the basis for the two-year limit, would require us to 
strike down that limit—for example, if the IRS enacted the 
two-year deadline based on an incorrect belief that the statute 
required it, or based on a factual supposition belied by the 
administrative record.  See, e.g., Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 
98, 120 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting immigration regulation at 
Chevron step two because it was based on an impermissible 
reading of the 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)).  Because the IRS has not 
articulated its reasoning, we cannot discern whether the two-
                                                                                                             
generally Jack M. Beerman, End the Chevron Experiment 
Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should 
be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 
2071 (1990); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and 
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. 
L. Rev. 452 (1989); Joseph F. Weis, Jr., A Judicial 
Perspective on Deference to Administrative Agencies: Some 
Grenades From the Trenches, 2 Admin. L. J. 301 (1988). 
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year limit falls into the permissible, or the arbitrary and 
capricious, category. 
Into the vacuum left by the IRS the Lantz Court has 
injected reasoning of its own, which my colleagues cite at 
length.  But it is black-letter law—and a necessary corollary 
of the deference owed to agencies—that courts may not 
supplement deficient agency reasoning.  Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (―The 
grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged 
are those upon which the record discloses that its action was 
based.‖).  Thus, the Lantz Court’s surrogate surmising of 
agency reasons does not, I believe, save the two-year limit.
7
 
Further, I do not find Lantz’s reasoning in support of 
the two-year limit to be convincing.  I will address those 
reasons, which my colleagues seemingly endorse, in turn. 
                                                 
7
 My colleagues largely do not engage in this exercise 
(though nothing they write shows disagreement), instead 
rejecting Ms. Mannella’s arguments against the two-year 
limit because they do not ―clearly demonstrate that Congress 
intended that requests for relief under subsection 6015(f) not 
be subject to a two-year filing deadline.‖  Maj. Op. at 20.  By 
this approach my colleagues place on Ms. Mannella the 
burden (a heavy one, at that) of proving that it is not 
reasonable to adopt a deadline backed by no reason.  I do not 
buy this approach.  Moreover, it also ducks the critical 
inquiry—whether the IRS’s reason for implementing the two-
year limit was ―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law.‖  5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A).  By abjuring reason, the IRS, I believe, abuses 
its discretion. 
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1.  Reason:  The Lantz Court wrote that, absent a two-
year deadline in (f), the two-year deadline in (b) would be 
made superfluous, as ―the substantive criteria of th[at] 
section[] are virtually the same as those of (f).‖  Lantz, 607 
F.3d at 484.  Indeed, it took this thought even further by 
stating that ―[h]ad the Treasury decided to impose no deadline 
on the filing of claims under subsection (f), or even just a 
deadline longer than two years, or in lieu of a fixed deadline 
the flexible deadline of the laches doctrine, it would have 
been undermining the two-year deadline fixed by Congress in 
subsection[] (b).‖  Id. 
 Response:  To begin, to the extent that it is correct 
that the ―substantive criteria‖ of (b) and (f) are ―virtually the 
same,‖ id. at 484, then Lantz’s approach renders subsection 
(f) superfluous, which cannot be what Congress intended.  As 
Lantz later notes, however (and the majority agrees, Maj. Op. 
at 18), there is a large class of taxpayers who would be 
eligible for relief under (f), but not (b), because the latter, 
unlike the former, applies only to:  (i) tax understatements, 
and not tax underpayments; id. at 486; and (ii) spouses who 
lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the 
understatement.   
Moreover, subsection (f) will not ―undermin[e]‖ the 
two-year deadline imposed in subsection (b) even as to those 
taxpayers who (but for the two-year limit) might qualify 
under both subsections.  Of significance, (f) is discretionary, 
whereas (b) is mandatory.  Compare § 6015(f) (―the Secretary 
may relieve [the innocent spouse] of such liability‖), with 
§ 6015(b) (―the [innocent spouse] shall be relieved of liability 
for tax‖) (emphases added).  Thus, even if (f) has no time 
limit, taxpayers who might qualify under (b) would be well-
advised to file in time to take advantage of that mandatory 
provision instead of waiting to seek discretionary relief under 
(f).  Put another way, Congress could have chosen to free the 
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IRS to afford discretionary relief to innocent spouses who 
missed the two-year deadline in certain exceptional cases, 
while maintaining the two-year limitations period for the 
mine-run of cases.   
 In addition, as my colleagues note, Maj. Op. at 21-22, 
Congress amended 26 U.S.C. § 66 (addressing the treatment 
of community property when spouses do not file joint returns 
in community-property states) by adding a subsection (c) at 
the same time it added subsection (f) to § 6015, and the 
language of each subsection mirrors the other.  Statements in 
the legislative history of § 66(c) indicate that the IRS should 
consider the timing of the request for relief.  H.R. Rep. No.  
98-432, pt 2, at 1501 & 03 (1984) (the IRS should consider, 
inter alia, ―whether the defense was promptly raised so as to 
prevent the period of limitations from running on the other 
spouse‖).  Moreover, the Tax Court pointed out in its decision 
now reversed by the Seventh Circuit that, ―[i]n [the] 
announcement of the proposed regulations under [§] 66(c), 67 
Fed. Reg. 2841 (Jan. 22, 2002), the Secretary [of the 
Treasury] observed that the relief provided in sec. 66(c) is 
analogous to the relief provision in section 6015(b) *** [and] 
section 6015(f).‖  Lantz v. C.I.R., 132 T.C. 131, 142 n.9 
(2009), overruled by 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 2.  Reason:  The Lantz Court also observed that 
―[s]ince the government can refuse to grant equitable relief to 
someone who meets the statutory criteria and applies within 
two years of the first collection action, why can’t it decide to 
deny relief to a class of applicants defined as those who 
waited too long?‖  607 F.3d at 485 (emphasis in text).   
 Response:  I agree that the answer to this rhetorical 
question is that the Secretary can exercise the discretion 
granted by subsection (f) either case-by-case or categorically.  
Cf. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 243-44 (2001) (Bureau of 
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Prisons could exercise its discretion to reduce the sentences of 
certain prisoners on a categorical basis).  However, because it 
is not clear why the IRS promulgated the two-year limit (or 
whether it even purported to do so as an exercise of its 
discretion at all, rather than out of a misguided perception of 
what the statute required), its authority to exercise its 
discretion categorically should not save the two-year limit the 
Regulation by ukase imposes.   
3.  Reason:  Though ―innocent spouses who fall 
through the cracks in (b),‖ Lantz, 607 F.3d at 484., have the 
safety protection of (f), ―[t]he details . . . were left to the 
Treasury Department to work out . . . .‖  Id.  The preamble to 
(f) confers on the Secretary of the Treasury the right to 
prescribe ―procedures‖ to relieve individuals of liability on 
joint income tax returns.  When claims may be brought is 
such a procedure.  ―Congress’s authorizing an agency to grant 
discretionary relief under procedures that the agency is to 
devise itself . . . writes the agency a blank check; and one of 
the blanks on the check is the deadline for applying for such 
relief.‖  Id. at 485. 
 Response:  If the preamble to both subsections (b) 
and (f) is ―[u]nder procedures prescribed by the Secretary,‖ 
and (b) has a deadline of two years while (f) does not, then is 
not that deadline substantive rather than procedural?  
Procedures here cover how to go about making a request for 
relief, and limitations periods are generally considered 
substantive.  Cf. Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 
2007) (statutes of limitation are substantive, not procedural, 
for purposes of determining whether state or federal law 
applies in diversity cases).  More specifically, in the tax 
context ―a time bar is not simply a procedural rule.  In the 
case of equity, it has the substantive effect of making one 
circumstance, the time of the claim, the only relevant factor.‖  
Hall v. C.I.R., 2010 WL 3703837 *3 (U.S. Tax Ct.). 
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4.  Reason:  Finally, the Lantz Court observed that the 
IRS could impose a deadline for subsection (f) applications 
―designed to reduce the flow to manageable proportions.‖  
607 F.3d at 486. 
 Response:  While it may be true that the IRS 
could impose a deadline in order to reduce the sheer number 
of applications for relief under subsection (f), that observation 
is of little relevance here, where there is no administrative (or 
other) record of an unmanageable flow of late-filed 
exemption applications.   
*    *    *    *    * 
 To deny taxpayers who miss the deadline to invoke 
subsection (b) even a chance to make an equitable exemption 
claim under (f) is concededly ―harsh.‖  Id.  Those taxpayers 
are left in a Catch-22 paradox:  they are ineligible to seek an 
exemption under (f) unless ineligible under (b), but once 
ineligible as to timing under the latter they can’t be eligible 
under the former.  The take-away thought for some may be 
that Congress could have drafted directly (or more clearly) 
but it didn’t, and now the agency gets to make the 
gatekeeping rules.  But the agency only gets to do so within 
reason.   
 And there’s the rub.  It gave no reasons.  Courts thus 
make up or surmise reasons (and even they underwhelm).  Is 
this the proper way to review interpretive decisions by 
agencies?   
The Supreme Court has answered that question in the 
negative.  To repeat:  ―[i]t is well-established that an agency’s 
action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the 
agency itself.‖  Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 50.  
When courts ignore that admonition, Chevron becomes an 
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exit ramp to the twilight zone by ―reliev[ing] the pressure on 
agencies to develop a full, expert record . . . .‖  Elizabeth V. 
Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration:  
How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and 
Why it Matters, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 673, 710 (Fall 2007).  In 
this way, ―[r]eviewing courts can brush off serious challenges 
to agency decisions by invoking Chevron without engaging 
whether the agency is thwarting imperfectly expressed 
congressional intent.‖  Beerman, End the Failed Chevron 
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can 
and Should be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. at 784.  I believe 
this is what happened here, and thus respectfully dissent. 
